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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue in this case is whether the operation of the Camp 
Williams Army National Guard NCO Club Bar was intended to be 
immune from liability for causes of action arising under the 
Utah Dram Shop Act at U.C.A. 32-11-1 by either U.C.A. 32-11-2 or 
U.C.A. 63-30-10(l)(i) . 
STATUTES TO BE REVIEWED 
The Judicial interpretation of the Legislative intent of 
the following statutes is determinative of this case. 
U.C.A. 32-11 
Section 1: 
(1) anv person who givesr sells or otherwise provides in-
toxicating liquor to another contrary to section 16-6-13.1(8) 
(d), section 32-1-36.5(1)(1) , section 32-7-14 or section 32-7-24 
(b) or (c) , and thereby causes the intoxication of the other 
person, is liable for injuries in oerson, property, or means of 
suoport to any third person, or the spouse, child, or parent of 
that third person, resulting from the intoxication. 
(2) A person who suffers an injury referred to in subsec-
tion (1) of this section, shall have a cause of action against 
the intoxicated person and the person who provided the intoxi-
cating liquor in violation of subsection (1) above, or either of 
them. 
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this 
section dies, the rights or liabilities provided by this section 
shall survive to or against that persons estate. 
Section 2: 
No nrovision of this act shall create any civil liability 
on the part of the State, its agencies, employees, or political 
subdivisions, arising out their activities in regulating, 
controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in, the 
sale or other distrubution of intoxicating liquor. 
U.C.A. 53-30 
Subsection 10(1) : 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for iniuries oroximately caused by a negligent act or ommission 
by an employee committed within the scope of his employment 
except if the injury: 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National 
Guard ? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a wrongful death action brought by the 
survivors of Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff. Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff was 
killed by a hit and run driver. The driver was Alexander Aerts 
who had a blood alcohol content of .19 percent. Jacquelyn 
Brinkerhoff was killed within six minutes after Defendant 
Alexander Aerts left the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO 
Club. Alexander Aerts was the guest of Conrad Christensen, who, 
at that time, was a member of the Camp Williams Army National 
Guard NCO Club. Alexander Aerts hit Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff from 
behind while she was bicycle riding safely out of the lane of 
traffic. She did not contribute to her demise. Jacquelyn 
Brinkerhoff s bicycle locked onto the front bumper of the 
vehicle Aerts was driving and he pushed it for another five (5) 
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miles before it fell off and one mile later was stopped by the 
oolice for the hit and run. Jacquelyn Brinkerhoff left behind 
six small children ranging in ages from six months to nine 
years. Alexander Aerts and the owner of the vehicle, which was 
Conrad Christensen1 s father, having already settled out, the 
only remaining Defendant is Allen Forsyth, a National Guard 
mechanic who moonlights as a bar tender at the Camp Williams 
Army National Guard NCO Club. 
Summary Judgment was grantel against Dlaintiffs by Judge 
Murohy of the Third District Court who ruled that the exemption 
from liability in section 2 of the Dram Shop Act shielded Allen 
Forsyth and the State of Utah from liability. further, Judge 
Murphy ruled, "the basis for ruling is the immunity granted in 
U.C.A. section 63-30-10(1)(i) and 32-1-2". The statutory his-
tory concerning the latter section is not justification for 
limiting immunity to the "wholesale" sale of liquor. As Plain-
tiff indicated, the statements of Senator Jeffs were made in the 
"frenzy" of the last day of legislative business. This appeal 
ensued, and the matter appears to be a case of first impression. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The governmental immunity section of the Dram Shop Act and 
the immunity for the National Guard were not intended to cover 
this situation of the National Guard's operation of the Camp 
Williams Army National Guard NCO Club. 
ARGUMENTS 
U.C.A. SECTION 32-11-2 WAS NOT INTENDED TO EXTEND IMMUNITY TO THE 
PRESENT SITUATION. 
When Courts apply statutory law, they are bound to consider 
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legislative intent so as to make the legislation meaningful and 
avoid absurd results, 
American Coal Co, vs. Sundstrom 689 P. 2d 1,3 (Utah 1984); Murray 
City vs. Hall 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983); Andrus vs, Allred 
404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah 1965); State vs. Jones 735 P.2d 399 at 
402 (Utah App. 1987); State vs. Day 638 P.2d 546 (Wash. 1981); 
Holy Trinity Church vs. United States, 143 U.S. 4 57, 12 S.Ct. 
511, 36 L. ed. 226; Markham vs. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 at 409, 66 
S.Ct. 193 at 195; Utah International, Inc. vs . Department of In-
terior 6 43 F. Supp. 810 at 821 (D. Utah 1986); Millet vs. Clark 
Clinic Corp. 509 P.2d 934, 936. 
To determine legislative intent, the Court can consider the 
historical setting of the statute, the circumstances surrounding 
its oromulgation and the purpose of the statute. Saffels vs. 
Bennet 630 P.2d 505, 510 (Wvo. 1981); Dependants of Fred Crawford 
vs. financial Plaza 643 P.2d 43, 53 (Ha. 198 2); Parker vs. Ramp-
ton 497 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1972); State vs. 1 Porsche 2 Door 
I.D.#911211026, Title #PP 10026F,etc. 526 P.2d 917 (Utah 1974). 
*f U«C.A Section 32-11-2 were to be applied according to its 
precise literalness then absurd results could ensue. The unqua-
lified exemption for State employees would create exemption from 
Dram Shop liability as an employee benefit of employment by the 
State. A social host could avoid Dram Shop Liability solely on 
the basis of his employment by the State while his private in-
dustry neighbor would be found liable for the exact same activ-
ity. This result would be totally absurd, but it would follow 
from a precise reading of the statute. Further, the statute de-
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prives the citizen's of Utah from the social responsibility the 
State as such has a duty to it's citizens. It is apparent from 
the face of U.C.A. Section 32-11-2 that the exemption is intended 
to be for the benefit of the State in fulfilling its duties in 
regulating the use of alcoholic beverages in the State. The 
State of Utah heavily regulates the distribution and sale of al-
cohol. Every ounce of intoxicating liquor sold in the State must 
at some time pass through State hands. Under the statute the 
exemption to the State of Utah and its employees applies to their 
"activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing or otherwise 
being involved in the sale or distribution of alcoholic bever-
ages." In view of the State's most obvious connection to 
alcohol, the three important words in the statute are regulating, 
controlling and authorizing. The "or otherwise being involved in 
the sale" language is an apparent addition to cover any situation 
where the State, as a regulator of alcoholic beverages, may slip 
out of the exact definition of regulation, control or authoriza-
tion. Had the legislature intended total exemption from liabili-
ty, they could have put a period after oolitical subdivisions. 
The excess wording is a clue to what they had in mind. 
The Dram Shop Act was introduced in the State Senate in 1981 
as Senate Bill 233. The enactment of the Dram Shop Act is part 
of the current trend toward protecting victims rights. In cases 
where someone suffers injury as a result of a person being intox-
icated, the Dram Shop Act increases the number of Defendants that 
such a Plaintiff has a cause of action against: Utah State Senate 
44th Legislative Session, Day 57, Disk 273, March 9, 1981. The 
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Act also encourages social responsibility on the part of persons 
who serve or sell alcohol. The Bill was passed by the Senate and 
referred to the House. While being considered by the House, the 
immunity for the State was amended out of the Bill; Utah House oF 
Representatives 44th Legislative Session, Day 60, Disks 3 and 4 , 
March 12, 1981 . When the Bill, as amended, was returned to the 
Senate, Senator Jeffs, the sponsor, said the following about the 
amendment. 
"The amendment to the Bill amended out the 
exemption for the State of Utah. There has 
been concern expressed by the Attorney General's 
office to me that if we exempt out, if we leave 
out the exemption for the State of Utah, since 
the State is in the wholesale liquor business, we 
run the risk of creating some large numbers of law 
suits no matter who sells the liquor, and they have 
asked me to request that we not accept the amend-
ment by the House and that we recede from it." (Utah 
State Senate 44th Legislative Session, Day 60, Disk 
309, March 12, 1981. ) 
The Amendment was refused by the Senate, the House relented 
and the Bill passed on the representation that the intent of 
U.C.A. section 32-11-2 was to protect the State while engaged in 
the wholesale liquor business. This all happened on the last day 
of the session when the legislature was in a frenzy to get done 
with its business. If the wording were to have been changed to 
reflect the intent to protect the State and it's employees only 
as liquor wholesalers, the bill would not have made it and 
another year would go by without the added remedies for victim's 
of drunk drivers. 
The Dram Shop Act was intended to create a cause of action 
in the exact situation we have in this case. Plaintiff's dece-
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d e n t was k i l l e d by an e x t r e m e l y i n t o x i c a t e d p e r s o n who had been 
s e r v e d l i q u o r a f t e r he was a l r e a d y i n t o x i c a t e d . The a c t i v i t i e s 
of D e f e n d a n t A l l e n F o r s y t h had n o t h i n g to do w h a t e v e r w i th t h e 
r o l e of t h e S t a t e in t h e w h o l e s a l e l i q u o r b u s i n e s s . The immunity 
c o n t a i n e d in U.C.ft s e c t i o n 3 2 - 1 1 - 2 i s an exempt ion i n t e n d e d f o r 
t h a t s p e c i f i c g o v e r n m e n t p u r p o s e and was n o t i n t e n d e d a s a 
l i c e n s e f o r g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s t o a c t w i t h o u t s o c i a l c o n -
s c i e n c e . 
ARGUMENT I I 
U.C.A. Section 63-30-10 (l)(i) WAS NOT INTENDED TO EXTEND IMMUNI-
TY TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. 
Section 63-30-10 (l)(i) of the Utah Code does not set up the 
Utah National Guard as an entity entirely outside the Civil Law 
of the State as Defendant would imply. The Utah National Guard 
exists for certain purposes, and the immunity granted to the 
Guard only applies to activities inherent to those certain pur-
poses. The most obvious purposes of the National Guard are their 
role as a part of the National Defense and their availability to 
assist in times of disaster. By no stretch of the imagination 
does the immunized role of the National Guard extend to operation 
of a bar. Defendant Forsyth's usual work for the Guard is as a 
mechanic. His work as a bartender is supplemtary and outside his 
usual duties. This further illustrates the separation of the NCO 
Club from legitimate Guard activities. 
To clothe the National Guard in immunity for whatever 
activities the Guard may engage in would be an utter absurdity. 
To avoid this absurdity and to make the statute meaningful, a 
restrictive reading of U.C.A. 63-30-10 (l)(i) is necessary. Most 
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of the cases cited in Argument I are applicable here. 
ARGUMENT 111 
A TEST FOR GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
To allow total government immunity in this situation is con-
trary to the guide lines laid down in Standiford vs. Salt Lake 
City Corporations, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). The Court, in the 
Standiford case did away with the old analogy of governmental im-
munity versus a proprietary function because of the conflicting 
results case law has established. The Court rejected the rigid 
dichotomy of the past because an activity is not proprietary it 
does not necessarily follow that the activity was governmental. 
The respondent would have this Court believe that this Court did 
not replace any type of analogy for determining governmental im-
munity. 
In fact, this Court provided a new test for governmental 
immunity. In the Standiford case the Court held: 
"Tests for determing governmental immunity 
is whether activity under consideration is 
of such unique nature that it can only be 
performed by governmental agency or that it 
is essential to the core of governmental 
activity." 
The Michigan Court has defined the term "government 
function" as those activities invoking the essence of government-
the "task of governing" - and those activities of such "peculiar" 
nature such that [they] can only be done by government." 27 3 N.W. 
2d at 416. 
Our Court went on to say they were less bound than the 
Michigan Supreme Court in redefining "governmental function". 
Unlike the Michigan Immunity Act, the Utah governmental Immunity 
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Act does not expressly approve past governmental tort liability, 
nor does it even mention, let alone define, "proprietary func-
tion." 
Michigan is not alone in abandoning the "inherently unsound" 
proprietary governmental "quagmire." 
In the Standiford case, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Section 63-30-1 etc: which became effective July 1, 1966 defines 
neither "governmental function" nor "proprietary function." In-
deed, the Act does not use the term "proprietary function"? it 
simply retains tort immunity for some governmental entities, sub-
ject to broad statutory exceptions, for injuries resulting from a 
"governmental function." Section 63-30-3, as amended by the 1978 
Legislature, reads as follows: 
"Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility. 
It has been stated in scholarly analysis that 
the legislature designed the statutory scheme 
bo allow the Court flexibility and adaptability 
in fashioning consistent and rational limits to 
governmenta1 immunity. To that end, the legis-
lature intended the Courts to have the pov/er to 
restrict the scopes of governmental immunity." 
[Emphasis added.] 
When the 1965 Legislature enacted the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, it broadened the liability of governmental 
entities....moreover, Legislature authorized public entities to 
secure liability insurance covering the entity and it's employ-
ees, Section 63-30-28 etc. The insurance authorization is rele-
vant as to whether a governmental immunity should be subjected to 
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liability on tort claims because one historical fear of limiting 
immunity has been the unexoected and unplanned for expense to the 
public entity. When the availability of insurance protection, 
coupled with the statutory provisions for ceiling on liability, 
governmental entities may confidentally and accurately budget for 
their potential tour of liability. The State of Utah is self-
insured until a certain dollar amount is reached, then a private 
insurer kicks in to cover the balance up to the statutory amount 
allowed by law. 
The Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO Club is an enter-
tainment facility provided bv the State of Utah to it's Army 
National Guard members and their guests who are not members of 
the Army National Guard. 
The Air Force National Guard NCO Club is not unlike the Camp 
Williams Army National Guard NCO Club. They both are owned and 
operated by the State of Utah as an entertainment facility for 
their National Guard members and their guests. The only dif-
ference is the Air Force National Guard NCO Club is located on 
private property and is required to have a State Liquor License 
for dispensing alcoholic beverages, where the Camp Williams Army 
National Guard NCO Club is not required to have a State Liquor 
License because it is located on State property. Therefore, the 
Air Force National Guard NCO Club is regulated by the State 
Liquor Agency and the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO Club 
is not. 
Since the Dram Shop Act imposed a strict liability the 
question arises, is the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO 
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Club immune to any liability because it is located on State pro-
perty and not required to have a State Liquor License where the 
Air Forece NCO Club is on private property and is required to 
have a State Liquor License not immune to liability? The analogy 
is clearly inconsistent with Respondent's argument of immunitv. 
Those regulated by the Liquor Commission and private parties are 
subject to the Dram Shop Act. 
In the State of Utah vs. Jones NO. 9 6019 9-CA; 5 5 Utah adv. 
rep. 60, the Court of Appeals ruled the Courts primary responsi-
bility is construing Legislation is to give effect to the intent 
of the Legislature. And the Court looked at Christensen vs. In-
dustrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1932). And the 
Court further stated, in addition, 
One of the fundamental rules of Statutory 
construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in light of the 
general purpose it was intended to serve 
and should be so interpreted and applied as 
to accomplish that objective. In order to 
give the statute the implementation which 
will fulfill it's purpose, reason and in-
tention sometimes prevail over the technic-
ally applied literalness. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Respondent would^ argue that because the Dram Shop Act 
unmi s takabley states that no provisions of the Dram Shop Act 
shall create any civil liability on the part of State employees 
arising out of their activity in regulating, controlling, author-
izing or otherwise being involved in, the sale of intoxicating 
liquor, the State and Aerts are immune. However, the Act itself, 
if tested under the Standiford case, does speak to governmental 
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functions. The Legislative history of the Dram Shop Act makes it 
clear that the governmental immunity protection was meant for 
package store owners. And the Legislature being aware of the 
Standiford case did not specifically narrow the scope of 32-11-2 
by providing that exemption from Dram Shop liability applies 
where State employees are exercising a governmental function. 
Even though the term "governmental function" is a term of artf 
the new interpretation is more strict than the old governmental 
vs. proprietarial function. 
It is apparent from the face of U.C.A. Section 32-11-2 that 
the exemption is intended to be for the benefit of the State in 
fulfilling it's duties in regulating the use of alcoholic bever-
ages in the State. The State of Utah heaviLy regulates the dis-
tribution and sale of alcohol. Every ounce of intoxicating 
liquor sold in the State must at sometime pass through State 
hands. Under the Statute, the exemption of the State of Utah and 
it's employees applies to their "activities in regulating, con-
trolling, authorizing, or otherwise being involved in the sale or 
distribution of alcoholic beverages." In view of the States most 
obvious connection to alcohol, three important words in the 
Statute are regulating, controlling and authorizing. The "or 
otherwise being involved in the sale" language is an apparent 
addition to cover any situation or the State as a regulator of 
alcohol beverages may slip out of the exact definition of a re-
gulation, control or authorization. Had the Legislature intended 
total exemption from liability they could have put a period after 
political subdivisions. The excess wording is a clue to what 
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they had in mind. 
Neither State employment nor membership in the National 
Guard automatically absolves any person from acting without 
social responsibility. The Defendant, Alan Forsythf should be 
liable to Plaintiffs for the injury they have suffered at the 
hands of Defendant Alan Forsyth serving intoxicating alcoholic 
beverages to Conrad Christensen and his guest at the Camp 
Williams Army National Guard NCO Club. The Utah National Guard 
exists for certain purposes, and the immunity granted to the 
Guard only applies to the activities inherent to those certain 
purposes. Most obvious purpose of the National Guard are the 
role as part of the National Defense and their availability to 
assist in times of disaster. By no stretch of the imagination 
does the immunized role of the National Guard extend to opera-
tions of a bar. Defendant Forsyth's usual work for the Guard is 
as a mechanic. His work as a bartender is supplementary and out-
side his usual duties. This further illustrates the separation 
of the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO Club from legitimate 
Guard activities. 
The function of the Camp Williams Army National Guard NCO 
Club can be performed by other than State of Utah government. 
Which is done daily by the establishment of private non-profit 
clubs. The running of the Army National Guard NCO Club is not 
essential to the core of governmental activity. 
The most general test of governmental function relates to 
the nature of the activity. It must be something done or 
furnished with the general public good, that is, "of a public or 
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governmental character" such as the maintenance operations of 
public schools, hospitals, public charities, public parks, or 
recreational facilities. 
Section 63-30-10(1)(i), Utah Code does not set up the Utah 
National Guard as an entity entirely outside the civil law of the 
State as Defendant/Respondent would imply. To clothe the State 
and it's political subdivisions i.e. the Utah National Guard in 
immunity for whatever activities is to nullify the social respon-
sibilities the State has to the citizens of the State of Utah and 
it would be an utter absurdity to do otherwise. 
The Lower Court's ruling should be reversed and remanded for 
a hearing to determine damages. 
DATED this Zg day of J ^ ^ * ^ 1 ^ r 1987. 
D. ARON STANTON & ASSOCIATES 
D. Aron Stanton 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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